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2	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
3	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
4	Case No. 11-14652(JMP); Adv. Pro. No. 11-02782
5	x
6	In the Matter of:
7	CONTEST PROMOTIONS-NY LLC,
8	Debtor.
9	x
10	CONTEST PROMOTIONS-NY LLC
11	Plaintiff,
12	- against -
13	THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
14	Defendant.
15	x
16	United States Bankruptcy Court
17	One Bowling Green
18	New York, New York
19	
20	November 15, 2011
21	10:11 AM
22	
23	BEFORE:
24	HON. JAMES M. PECK
25	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

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declarant, which declined to appear today, to talk about harm to the city if this relief is granted pending a determination on whether the city will be successful in overturning the relief that the debtor already has obtained in the state court below.

So from our perspective, I think that's just one more thing I would mention to Your Honor, that, on the balance, that's where this really comes into sharp focus. It's the ongoing future of this company, plus the stake of all the indemnities, weighed against the city's asserted interest in an enforcement policy which, granted, is worthy of some weight but less so, we believe, when the state court already has decisively ruled against it. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you all. I think we've taken our share of breaks today, but we're going to take one more.

I'm going to take about a ten minute break and I'm going to gather my thoughts and endeavor to provide a ruling this afternoon. So I'll see you in about ten minutes.

(Recess from 3:28 p.m. until 3:38 p.m.)

THE COURT: Be seated please. I recognize that the matter before the Court is of a potentially critical significance to the viability of this Chapter 11 case. And I accept the statements made by debtor's counsel concerning the vital nature of the relief being sought on behalf of his client, Contest Promotions.

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I've reviewed all the papers and the declarations and
I've paid careful consideration to the arguments that have been
made today as well as the testimony of Rick Del Mastro and
Robert Hochman. I regret to inform the debtor that I do not
believe that the standards applicable to the grant of a
preliminary injunction have been met here.

As the debtor's own moving papers state at page 14, the standard in the Second Circuit is clear. A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show (1) a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction; and (2) either a likelihood of success on the merits where sufficiently serious question is going to the merits or the balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the movant's favor.

It's questionable whether either of these standards has been met, but nothing has been shown with respect to prong number 2, a likelihood of success on the merits and a sufficiently serious question going to the merits.

As to a likelihood of irreparable harm, that may be a closer question but I find that there has been a failure to show irreparable harm here. One of the reasons for that is embedded in the testimony of Mr. Hochman who responded to a number of questions in a very thoughtful and helpful way to the Court. But he also demonstrated, at least to my understanding, that, as the city has contended, there is a robust administrative law process which is available and has always

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been available to this debtor to deal with issues of enforcement.

Perhaps most significantly, the debtor is relying upon .

the efficacy of a judicial determination made by Justice

Rakower which is currently on appeal.

The debtor finds itself, in what seems to be, a terrible dilemma. Based upon what has been represented in court, it seems to me that a successful appeal by the city of Justice Rakower's decision does nothing to change the current state of play at the administrative law level because, as has been noted, the debtors prevailed before Justice Rakower with respect to the relief that was there being sought. But based upon my understanding of that relief, it does not really go to the penalty phase of this enforcement action rather it indicates in a rather theoretical way, from my perspective, that the business model can be consistent with an accessory use. It does not declare, as I read the decision, that the Environmental Control Board or any administrative law judge needs to follow that business model with respect to a particular use.

As I said at the outset of this proceeding, I was concerned about the excessive reliance upon business model and insufficient reliance on actual application of the model in the field. No evidence was presented here with pictures and schematics of what these signs look like. I know what the

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signs look like because I've seen them in the submission made by the city but I'm not considering that as evidence because they haven't been offered into evidence.

Nonetheless, if the debtor is going to carry its burden of, in effect, seeking to have this Court trump the state court system with respect to a state law city-based scheme of regulation, quite a bit more needs to be shown than was shown here today. Because the relief that is being sought is not just a preliminary injunction, it's an intervention.

The debtor is seeking to have a federal court override the existing regulatory regime which carries within it appellate rights. I am loath to do that on this record and I'm not sure I am willing to do it on any record. For that reason, the likelihood of irreparable harm, in my view, has not been shown because of the existing parallel ability to obtain some form of relief in the state court system.

I'm also troubled for the reasons expressed that what is being sought here is, in effect, a bankruptcy override of determinations made not only by the Environmental Control Board and administrative law judges who function within that scheme, but also, in effect, an interpretation of Justice Rakower's decision.

I've looked at the transcript and I've looked at the order and to the extent that the debtor needs relief, I urge that that relief be sought from courts of competent

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jurisdiction with actual expertise in the area of zoning and advertising.

As to the second prong of the standard for granting a preliminary injunction, there's really nothing in the record that I can point to and nothing has been pointed to by counsel demonstrating that there is a likelihood of success on the merits with sufficiently serious questions going to the merits. The principal reason that I find this prong not having been satisfied is that the only evidence that has been presented has been presented through Mr. Del Mastro who is really not in a position to talk about the merits of the litigation and by Mr. Hochman who is simply talking about the administrative law process. Nothing has really been presented with respect to the merits of the litigation itself against the city.

Now, embedded in all this is an unproven hypothetical. That hypothetical is that the city is involved in harsh treatment of this particular company, that its enforcement regime is being used deliberately to abuse this debtor. I see no evidence of that. That doesn't mean that it isn't possibly true, it's just that based upon the evidence presented no one from the city has been deposed, to my knowledge. No one from the city has been subpoensed, to my knowledge. No one from the city has offered any testimony concerning the application of its regulatory regime with respect to this debtor and how it compares with any other party that may be involved in outdoor

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advertising or accessory signs within the City of New York.

For that reason, the record is largely silent as to one of the most fundamental questions before the Court which is, is the city acting unfairly here. Is there something illegitimate about the way in which they are going after this company and imposing harsh fines, treating these signs as advertising rather than as accessory uses? I understand that's how they have been treating the signs. What hasn't been presented is that that's unfair or that they're acting unreasonably, or there's anything incorrect about the administrative judgments and treating these as, I'll call them nonconforming uses.

Accordingly, the debtors' motion for a preliminary injunction is denied but that doesn't necessarily mean that at some time at a future point in this litigation if the litigation is still alive and if the Chapter 11 case or some other case under the Code is still alive that it may not be possible to present evidence that would support the claims that have been made against the city. That evidence hasn't been presented here.

Now, let me turn to the question, briefly, of Section 362(b)(4) and the exception from the automatic stay of Section 362(a) for the exercise of police and regulatory powers by a governmental unit. The ongoing enforcement activity of the city appears to fit squarely within that exception but I don't

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need to make that determination now. I don't need to make that determination in the context of denying the motion for summary -- excuse me -- for preliminary injunction.

In effect, the city is at its peril in continuing to enforce on the strength of that exception knowing that it is the debtors' legal position that the exception does not properly apply. Whatever rights and remedies may flow from a proven violation, can be presented at some future time. In as far as what this means to the case, that's for the parties to determine. And I have nothing more to add so we're adjourned. Thank you.

MR. RAICHT: Your Honor, before we adjourn, one last point. Is it based upon this record, is there -- would the Court give consideration to issuing a limited stay for the purpose of the debtor seeking redress in a state forum, an appropriate state forum, and to lift the automatic stay to the extent it applied to any such relief we might seek in that state forum?

THE COURT: Well, let me just deal -- I'll give the parties a chance to respond to this. I don't see any immediate and irreparable harm here that requires a stay. Based upon the record that has been presented, there's no indication that tomorrow or next week there's going to be a taking of assets or an interruption of the debtors' ability to operate by virtue of the city's regulatory activities. In fact, my takeaway from

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1	Mr. Hochman's testimony was that this is a somewhat time-
2	consuming process. I recognize that there is the potential for
3	harm to the business model by virtue of the impact of these
4	fines on the property owners and store owners, the various
5	proprietors that are potentially liable along with Contest
6	Promotions. I see no proof here that there is any immediate
7	risk with respect to even that group because while there has
8	been some general statements, there have been general
9	statements made by the two witnesses concerning the role played
10	by these individuals, nobody has said that immediately
11	somebody's going to tear down a sign or stop doing business.
12	There's nothing in the record to confirm that risk. And to the
13	extent that any party who is not a property owner identifies
14	that risk, it's not competent evidence; it's pure hearsay.
15	No property owner, no store owner came here as a
16	witness. Everything with respect to that aspect of the case is
17	suggestion rather than proof at the moment. I am not inclined
18	to impose any stay and believe that if there is a concerted
19	effort by the debtors to pursue relief in a court of competent
20	jurisdiction within the state system there's time to do that.
21	If I'm wrong, I'm sorry about those consequences but today's
22	record didn't prove an entitlement to any relief.
23	We're adjourned.
24	MR. RAICHT: Thank you, Your Honor.
25	(Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 3:56 p.m.)